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Abstract 
Economist and former FTC Executive Director Bruce Yandle uses research by Stewart 
and Cromartie published previously in Presidential Studies Quarterly as a springboard for 
further analysis of the political economy of the FTC. He provides new data and suggests that 
perhaps the "party in power" model's attempt to explain regulatory politics should yield to con- 
gressional and special interest models. Reconsiderations of both studies clarify the meanings 
of the findings and suggest paths for future research on this topic. It is also suggested that 
it is probably premature to dispose of Presidential partisanship as a variable for analysis in 
future studies. 
FTC Activity and Presidential Effects Revisted 
An article by Yandle in this journal1 uses our earlier analysis of FTC en- 
forcement activity in the area of deceptive practices over time (1938-1974)2 as a spring- 
board for further research. We are gratified that our work has been deemed worthy 
of comment or citation by Yandle and by others.3 As Yandle notes, we focus on only 
one category of FTC activity, and he proposes to extend the analysis by (1) adding 
antitrust cases to the analysis so that "all commission final actions" are taken into 
account "when seeking to explain the agency's widely varying law enforcement activi- 
ties;" (2) considering the FTC's "capability" to take enforcement action "since the 
resources appropriated for the agency varied significantly across its history;" and, (3) 
adding data for the period 1916-1939 to the 1938-1974 time-frame we use. In addi- 
tion, Yandle provides data on the "political composition of each commission and the 
party identification feach FTC chairman" over the entire time period.4 
Using annual "final actions"5 and "final actions" per employee (the latter being 
Yandle's means of accounting for capability) as dependent variables and using a differ- 
ence of means test, Yandle finds no significant difference b tween levels of these vari- 
ables in Democratic and Republican Presidential dministrations.6 He also finds (1) 
no partisan differences in "the occurrence of chairman and [a majority of the] commis- 
sioners with the same party identification" and (2) a high "coincidence of common 
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party affiliation for chairmen and presidents."7 Yandle suggests that his findings should 
redirect he foci of researchers away from party in power and life cycle-incrementalism 
models of regulatory influence and toward "the special interest theories, combined 
with congressional influence."8 
While, as Yandle notes, his "findings do not deny the relationship reported by 
Stewart and Cromartie,"9 the implications of the studies are sufficiently divergent to 
command closer examination. We reexamine both analyses to clarify the meanings 
of the findings and to suggest paths for future research on this topic. 
Our Data, Yandle's Method 
One source of the apparently divergent implications may lie in the methods 
used. What results obtain if the deceptive practices data used in our original analysis 
are analyzed in the manner used by Yandle? Table 1 presents the results and shows 
that the results are similar to Yandle's Table 4.10 The average level of deceptive practices 
complaints issued is higher in years when a Democrat occupies the White House than 
in GOP years, but the difference is not significant. 
Does this analysis contradict our earlier work? Our answer is "no." We did not 
mean to imply in our earlier work that the absolute levels of deceptive practices regula- 
tion are higher during Democratic administrations. Such an implication would ignore 
timing as an important influence on such activities, and we note that there has been 
a slight decrease in official deceptive practices complaints issued over time.11 Thus, 
we plead both guilty and innocent to the allegation that we assume "that actions 
are homogeneous through time."12 Like Yandle, we assume that an official complaint 
issued during Franklin Roosevelt's presidency is equivalent, as a unit of analysis, to 
a complaint issued during Lyndon Johnson's tenure. We simply know of no way to 
proceed with the analysis of this important issue without making this assumption. 
We do not assume that the level of activity during the Wilson administration (or 
any Democratic administration) should be more similar to that of the Johnson ad- 
ministration five decades later (or any other Democratic administration) than it is 
to the level of activity during the succeeding Harding administration (or any other 
Republican administration). Only Yandle's approach requires such an assumption; it 
is examined empirically in our analysis. We find clear similarities in the trends in the 
issuance of official deceptive practices complaints within partisan administrations and 
clear differences in the trends between partisan administrations. Regardless of the abso- 
lute levels, our original conclusion holds. The trends in the issuance of official decep- 
tive practices complaints by the FTC decline during Democratic administrations and 
TABLE 1 
Official Deceptive Practices Complaints Issued by the FTC by Party in the 
White House, 1938-1974 
Party N Mean Std. Deviation 
Democratic 23 125.1 91.8 
Republican 14 109.1 37.2 
F - 0.38; significance level « .54. 
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rise during Republican administrations from 1938-1974. The wave-like pattern would 
lead us to anticipate Yandle's finding of no difference, as a downswing would be fol- 
lowed by an upswing (and vice versa) after a partisan Presidential transition. Further 
evidence of the fact that the mean level of complaints masks important variations in 
our finding that a model including the partisan Presidential transitions increases our 
ability to explain variance by 53 percentage points over a simple model that does not 
include such transitions.13 
Looking at the Forest, Missing the Trees 
Another reason for reaching different conclusions may lie in the fact that 
Yandle includes a wider range of phenomena over a broader span of time than do 
we. While more expansive analyses are usually to be applauded, they can also become 
overly inclusive, blurring the nature of the object of analysis. 
Yandle notes that the FTC's activities are "widely varying,"14 so why should we 
combine diverse phenomena and expect similar patterns of influence? The major addi- 
tion Yandle makes is in the form of anti-trust complaints. Do we really expect the 
same political actors to be concerned with or to influence deceptive practices regula- 
tion and anti-trust regulation? 
While a direct answer to this question is beyond the scope of this study, we can 
offer some suggestive, secondary evidence. Mahaney and Tschoegl15 analyze FTC anti- 
trust activity from 1917-1980 and argue that FTC complaint issuance in that area 
is most strongly affected by "the percentage of Democrats in the Senate, the rate of 
growth of real GNP, and the early and recent years of FTC existence."16 Their findings 
in conjunction with our earlier work on deceptive practices suggest that Presidential 
partisanship is the major determinant of trends in deceptive practices enforcement, 
while Senate partisanship is the major determinant of anti-trust activity. If different 
forces, whatever they might be, are useful in explaining the separate activities of the 
FTC, we would not necessarily expect to be able to explain overall patterns of the 
FTC's behavior as well as we could explain the component parts.17 
Certainly none of the studies cited here, including our own, are adequate to test 
these hypotheses.18 But, the findings are consistent with an argument that by fol- 
lowing Yandle's cell to examine the influences on the FTC in general, we may miss 
the influences on the specific parts. Just as "one should not consider regulatory policy 
or regulatory commissions as one homogeneous type,"19 it appears that even within 
commissions general analyses may miss important variations. Put another way, if we 
pose the question "Why do we have this forest?" we may not be able to answer the 
question "Why do we have these specific kinds of trees in the forest?" Both are obvi- 
ously questions worthy of study. But, we suspect that the latter is more susceptible 
to successful resolution, which should guide research on the former. 
A Brief Analysis of Yandle's Data, Our Method 
Despite our serious misgivings about combining all FTC complaints for 
analysis, we go through the exercise of subjecting Yandle's data to a multiple inter- 
rupted time series (MITS) analysis, the method we use in our original analysis.20 While 
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the patterns found by examining Yandle's dependent variables do not lead to the same 
conclusions as when we examine only deceptive practices complaints, we are not quite 
as ready as Yandle to discard presidential effects as an explanation for regulatory pat- 
terns. First, modeling partisan Presidential transitions enhances our ability to explain 
levels of "final actions" and "final actions" per employee over simpler, incremental 
models. Bivariate regression of "final actions" over time explains only 12 percent of 
the variance as opposed to 49 percent with our MITS analysis; for "final actions" 
per employee, the comparable figures are 8 percent and 42 percent. 
Second, in each partisan Presidential era, with the exception of the truncated 
Nixon-Ford years, significant changes occur in either the short-term or in the trend. 
Using Yandle's dependent variables, the data show clear differences between partisan 
Presidential eras. The difference between this conclusion and the conclusion of our 
previous work is that the directions of partisan Presidential effects are not consistently 
different between parties. FTC activities rise during the Wilson Democratic era and 
the Eisenhower Republican years; the trend lines are negative during the Harding- 
Coolidge-Hoover Republican years and during the Kennedy-Johnson Democratic years. 
Furthermore, the inauguration of Democrat Roosevelt presages a jump in FTC ac- 
tivity, and Kennedy's swearing in marks a sharp decline in "final actions" per em- 
ployee. In sum, in explaining overall FTC activity from 1916-1974, whether measured 
in raw output ("final actions") or in efficiency ("final actions" per employee) terms, 
partisan Presidential effects are not consistent, but Presidential transitions do make 
a difference. 
Yandle also provides data on the party affiliations of the Chairpersons of the FTC 
and the majority of Commissioners, but he does not analyze them extensively. He 
does not directly address the possibilities that the partisanship of the FTC Chairperson 
or majority might have independent effects on the FTC's activities. To address these 
possibilities, partisanship of the FTC Chairperson and of the FTC majority are added 
to the MITS equation, separately and together.21 For "final actions," the addition of 
neither variable, individually nor together, enhances the analysis. For "final actions" 
per employee, the partisanship of the Chairperson by itself has a significant positive 
effect, but this is mitigated by the addition of the partisanship of the FTC's majority 
as a variable. In short, the partisanship of the FTC's Chair and majority do not seem 
to have a major impact independent of the party controlling the White House. 
Conclusions 
We are happy that Yandle has chosen to take up our call for further esearch 
on the politics of the FTC. Given the combination of his academic expertise and his 
former position as Executive Director of the FTC, his thoughts provide a valuable 
service to those of us who research such important institutions from afar (the "view 
from the sticks" as one of Stewart's former colleagues has so aptly put it). His work 
offers further insights on this important organization and has prompted us to think 
more systematically about our own work. Although Yandle and we, as is all too common 
in research, talk past each other tò a certain extent, there are clear conclusions that 
can be reached by appropriately combining our findings. 
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Yandle makes the important point that we cannot merely rely on Presidential 
partisanship to predict the absolute levels of activity of the FTC over time. To the 
extent that we implied that or that readers inferred that from our previous work, 
we apologize for not being pellucid. Our point is that the trends in FTC deceptive 
practices complaint issuance through 1974 are interestingly different between Democratic 
and Republican administrations. 
But, we appear to differ with Yandle on two points. First, we suspect that focusing 
on overall FTC activity as opposed to focusing on patterns within its widely varied 
areas of responsibility may obscure as much as it reveals about the political economy 
of the FTC. The broader focus is consistent with the efforts of both political scientists 
and economists to develop "general theories" of regulation. But, as Yandle duly notes 
with his outline of five of these theories,22 each has its blinders. We would suggest 
that an inductive approach drawing on the insights of various theories and focused 
on delineating the crucial political and economic factors in the various sub-areas of 
regulation (e.g. deceptive practices, anti-trust) may be more appropriate. This approach 
offers the promise of building empirical theories which may sensitize us to critical 
conditional relationships which have thwarted our effectiveness in developing valid 
general theories. 
In addition, such research should consciously consider change over time. It is 
not clear why we should expect the influences crucial to the FTC in one era to neces- 
sarily be the major variables explaining activity at another time. 
The second point with which we would disagree with Yandle is on the appro- 
priate foci of research in seeking to explain variations in FTC activity. While he may 
well be correct in suggesting that "the special interest theories, combined with con- 
gressional influence."23 will prove to be most valid, we are not yet ready to eliminate 
from consideration partisan Presidential influence as a significant predictor. Our re- 
search is not alone in finding Presidential effects,24 so we would urge more explicit 
testing of Presidency-related variables in conjunction with other possible influences 
before they are ignored. 
Finally, we join with Yandle in calling for more research using "richer models."25 
We concur with Moe that "simple popular models of regulation are likely to give 
anemic explanations, if not highly distorted accounts of why agencies behave as they do."26 
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